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I.  INTRODUCTION 
To the indigenous people of Peru, a strong relationship exists between land and 
livelihood.  They depend on their land for the food they eat, the water they drink, and 
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the resources they use to build their shelter.  It follows that a threat to their property 
rights also threatens their survival; this past year, they have proven that they are 
prepared to defend their property rights with their lives.  
This Note shows that between the legal systems of Peru, the Organization of 
American States (OAS), and the United Nations (UN), Peru’s indigenous people 
should pursue their claim against Peru’s government in the OAS.  However, because 
the OAS lacks a mechanism to enforce its policy and must rely on political pressure, 
Peru’s indigenous people are still far from a complete remedy.  Currently, Peruvian 
law (particularly the Peruvian Constitution), as well as law promulgated by the OAS 
and the UN, all contain express provisions that are designed to protect the property 
rights of indigenous communities.1  However, recent events in Peru have shown that 
the weight of these provisions has failed to exceed that of the paper they are written 
on, as their substance and overall policy has failed to achieve implementation.2 
 In the interest of economic gain, Peru’s President has passed multiple 
presidential decrees, stripping the above-mentioned laws of their effect.3  Peru’s 
indigenous communities have responded to these decrees by going to the streets in 
protest, resulting in fatalities on both sides of the conflict.4  The presidential decrees 
are the most recent development of a history of government corruption and 
complicity in legal violations regarding land grants to foreign investors who wish to 
exploit Peru’s valuable resources.5  These land grants have frequently come at the 
displeasure of the indigenous people who inhabit the land being exploited.  How are 
Peruvians to enforce their rights in a domestic system infested with those who 
disregarded their rights by giving their land away in the first place? 
Section II of this Note describes the background of the Peru’s current conflict.  
By providing a timeline of the events leading up to the protests, as well as illustrating 
the source of indigenous peoples’ distrust in their government, this section presents a 
reasonable justification for the need of indigenous peoples to take action to protect 
their rights.  Recently enacted presidential decrees weaken indigenous peoples’ 
                                                                 
 1 See CONSTITUCION POLITICIA DEL PERU, art. 89 (1993), available at 
http://www.congreso.gob.pe/_ingles/CONSTITUTION_29_08_08.pdf [hereinafter PERUVIAN 
CONSTITUTION]; Organization of American States, Proposed American Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Art. 18, approved by the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights at its 1333rd session on February 26, 1997, in OEA/Ser L/V/II.95.doc.7, rev. 
1997 [hereinafter Proposed American Declaration]; United Nations Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. Doc. A/Res/61/295/Annex (Oct. 7, 2007) 
[hereinafter UN Declaration]. 
 2 See MAUREEN TAFT-MORALES, PERU: CURRENT CONDITIONS AND U.S. 
RELATIONS 3 (Congressional Research Service) (2009) (citing ECONOMIST, Oil and Land 
Rights in Peru: Blood in the Jungle, June 11, 2009, available at http://www.economist.com/ 
node/13824454?story_id=13824454) [hereinafter TAFT-MORALES]; Milagros Salazar, Peru: 
Indigenous Groups Challenge Private Investment Decree (May 29, 2009), http://ipsnews.net/ 
news.asp?idnews=42578. 
 3 See TAFT-MORALES, supra note 2, at 3-4. 
 4 Id. at 3. 
 5 See id. at 2. 
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ability to protect their lands from encroachment by foreign investors.6  Further, the 
methods by which the decrees were passed violate Peru’s obligations under both 
domestic and international laws.7  However, government corruption has lead 
indigenous communities to doubt their chances of obtaining a legal remedy, causing 
them to take to the streets in protest.8 
Section III of this Note illustrates the relevant provisions in Peru’s domestic and 
international legal schemes.  This section reveals that, among others, two important 
rights are common to Peruvian law, the OAS, and the UN.  First is the right to prior 
consultation, meaning that indigenous peoples must be consulted before the 
government initiates any activity or program that will affect indigenous peoples’ 
land.9  Second is the right to sovereign discretion as to how the land should be used.10  
The enactment of the presidential decrees was an explicit violation of prior 
consultation, and the effect its application will have on indigenous property rights 
will no doubt lead to a violation of the right to sovereignty over land usage. 
Section IV illustrates how Peru has generally not enforced the substance of the 
aforementioned rights, again showing that the presidential decrees are the final act in 
a history of disregarding indigenous interests.  In contravention of the Peruvian 
constitution, as well as law from the OAS and UN, Peru has enacted laws that 
promote foreign investment and encroachment on indigenous lands.11 
Section V highlights institutional and policy differences between Peru, the OAS, 
and the UN that effectively make the OAS the best forum for Peru’s indigenous 
people to assert their claims.  For example, Peru’s government has frequently been 
accused of corruption and complicity regarding violations of its environmental law 
by foreign investors.12  Further, the International Court of Justice, the principal 
judicial body of the UN, only hears disputes between two states.13  Although both the 
OAS and UN have organizations designated to further the interests of indigenous 
                                                                 
 6 Lila Barrera-Hernandez, Peruvian Indigenous Land Conflict Explained (June 16, 2009), 
http://www.as-coa.org/article.php?id=1710; TAFT-MORALES, supra note 2, at 3. 
 7 Salazar, supra note 2. 
 8 See TAFT-MORALES, supra note 2, at 3. 
 9 See PERUVIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 1; Proposed American Declaration, supra 
note 1, arts. 21, 25; UN Declaration, supra note 1, art. 30. 
10 See PERUVIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 1; Proposed American Declaration, supra 
note 1, arts. 21, 24; UN Declaration, supra note 1, art. 30. 
11 See Sergio A. Leiseca & Lawrence L. Johnson, Investment Incentives Law Goes into 
Effect in Peru, LATIN AMERICAN LAW AND BUSINESS REPORT, Jan. 31, 1999, at 21; 
TAFT-MORALES, supra note 2, at 3-4; Salazar, supra note 2; Barrera-Hernandez, supra note 6. 
12 TAFT-MORALES, supra note 2, at 2-3. 
13 International Court of Justice, The Court, http://www.icj-cij.org/court/index.php?p1=1&                          
,&PHPSESSID =0d004b984801f15bf847e577331a6177 (last visited Mar. 1, 2011). See also 
International Court of Justice Case Page,  http://www.icjcij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3 (last 
visited Mar. 1, 2011) (explaining that the court gives Advisory Opinions on legal issues by 
specialized agencies and settles legal disputes filed by one State against another State). 
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peoples, the OAS is the only organization that can also afford them an impartial 
judicial decision in their favor.14 
Finally, Section VI explains that the best legal avenue for the indigenous 
population to effectively protect their land rights against their government is to 
submit their case to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Inter-American 
Court) of the OAS.  Among other reasons, in recent history the OAS has 
demonstrated a strong interest in protecting indigenous peoples.15 
II.  PERU’S INDIGENOUS PEOPLE HAVE A REASONABLE BASIS FOR SEEKING 
PROTECTION OF THEIR LAND RIGHTS FROM THE GOVERNMENT 
Recent legislation promoting resource exploitation, along with a tradition of 
promoting foreign investment and multiple instances of government corruption, has 
led the Peruvian indigenous communities to reasonably distrust their domestic legal 
system.  Peru has a long tradition of selling or leasing land to foreign investors.16  
Most recently, Peru’s President has issued presidential decrees, the most 
controversial of which ultimately apply to make acquiring indigenous land easier for 
foreign investors.17  For instance, the president has used his legislative power to 
reduce the number of votes required from members of an indigenous community to 
consent to a sale of the community’s land.18  He also has enacted decrees that 
broaden the government’s power to grant indigenous land to foreign investors.19  
These decrees are only the most recent instances of Peru’s tradition of promoting 
foreign investment, this time leading to a series of violent protests, motivating Peru’s 
                                                                 
14 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, What is the IACHR?, 
http://www.cidh.oas.org/what.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2011) (explaining that any person, 
group, or nongovernmental organization can submit a petition to the Commission, and the 
Commission in turn determines whether the case should be submitted to the Inter-American 
Court). 
15 See generally Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, 
2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser C) No. 79 (Aug. 31, 2001), available at 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_79_ing.pdf [hereinafter Awas case]; 
Mary and Carrie Dann v. U.S., Case 11.140, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 75/02, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.117, doc. 1, rev. 1 (2002), available at http://www.iachr.org/annualrep/2002 
eng/USA.11140.htm [hereinafter Mary Case]; see Maya Indigenous Cmtys. of the Toledo 
Dist. v. Belize, Case 12.053, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 40/04, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.122, doc. 
5, rev. 1 (2004), available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/2004eng/Belize.12053eng. 
htm [hereinafter Maya Case]; Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, 2006 Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146 (Mar. 29, 2006), available at http://www.corteidh.or.crdocs/ 
casos/articulos/seriec_146ing.pdf [hereinafter Paraguay Case]. 
16 See EarthRights Int’l et al., A Legacy of Harm: Occidental Petroleum in Indigenous 
Territory in the Peruvian Amazon 11 (2007), available at http://www.earthrights.org/sites/ 
default/files/publications/A-Legacy-of-Harm.pdf (citing Philippe Descola., La Selva Culta: 
Simbolismo y Praxis en La Ecologia de Los Achuar (Abya Yala, Coleccion Pueblos del 
Ecuador 3, Tercera Edicion, Ecuador, 1996)). 
17 See Barrera-Hernandez, supra note 6; Salazar, supra note 2. 
18 See Salazar, supra note 2. 
19 See Barrera-Hernandez, supra note 6. 
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President to deploy government police to quiet those involved.20  When the soldiers 
engaged the protestors, a conflict ensued resulting in multiple fatalities.21  Indigenous 
people’s skepticism of their domestic government is further perpetuated by frequent 
occurrences of corruption among government officials.22 
A.  Presidential Decrees and Indigenous Protests 
In 2008, the Peruvian Congress gave President Garcia the power to create 
implementing legislation by presidential decree, so long as the legislation was 
intended to implement the Peru Trade Promotion Agreement (PTPA) with the United 
States.23  He then issued over ninety-nine presidential decrees, attempting to hastily 
implement the agreement before George W. Bush’s Presidential term expired.24  
Under the PTPA, which concluded on December 7, 2005, tariffs between the two 
nations were eliminated, and Peru was to create a stable, predictable legal scheme for 
U.S. investors conducting business within its territory.25  One desired effect of the 
agreement was for Peru to strengthen the country’s development prospects.26  
One of the decrees passed by President Garcia was Decree 1015, which provided 
that indigenous communities may permit the sale or lease of communal land to 
private investors with a vote of just over fifty percent of members present in 
community assemblies.27  This altered the previous standard that required two-thirds 
of the qualified community members consent in order to sell or lease the land.28  
Also, those who vote are no longer required to be qualified community members; 
anyone who is present at a community assembly is permitted to vote.29  This has led 
to a fear that foreign investors interested in encroaching on indigenous land may 
influence these assemblies by paying disinterested individuals to attend and vote in 
favor of selling.30 
                                                                 
20 David Dudenhoefer, Amazonian Indigenous Protest Provokes Peruvian Government 
Reprisals, ENV’T NEWS SERVICE, May 27, 2009, http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/may 
2009/2009-05-26-02.asp. 
21 Chris Kraul & Adriana Leon, 13 Killed as Indians Battle Police, L.A. TIMES, June 6, 
2009, http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jun/06/world/fg-peru6. 
22 See TAFT-MORALES, supra note 2, at 2-3. 
23 See TAFT-MORALES, supra note 2, at 3. 
24 Id. (explaining that the reason for rushing the implementation of the trade agreement 
was to make sure it was in place before United States President George W. Bush’s term 
expired). 
25 Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, United States and Peru  
Conclude Free Trade Agreement (Dec. 7, 2005), available at http:www.ustr.gov/sites/default  
files/uploads/agreements/mefta/asset_upload_file744_8518.pdf. 
26 Id. 
27 See Salazar, supra note 2. 
28 See id. 
29 See id. 
30 See id.  
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Decrees 994 and 020-2008-AG created a legal scheme aiming to facilitate speedy 
concessions of “idle and unproductive land” with agricultural potential to private 
investors.31  The obvious problem, however, is that most of the land within the scope 
of the decree is traditionally occupied by indigenous people.32  Decree 1064 is related 
to Decree 994 in that it expands Decree 994’s already broad definition of “idle and 
unproductive land.”33  Further, it also eradicates the requirement that foreign 
investors have prior informed consent from indigenous communities before 
encroaching on their land.34  President Garcia also passed Decree 1090, a new 
forestry law that removes deforested land from the protection of the state.35  This 
makes any deforested land available to sell to foreign investors.  Soon after this law 
was passed, illegal deforestation commenced on indigenous land in order to make it 
open for sale.36  Finally, Decree 1089 provides that it is in the nation’s interest to title 
lands having agricultural potential.37  This gives the state title to all land capable of 
agricultural use, taking priority over any pending indigenous titling proceedings 
regarding the same area.38 
Opponents of these decrees argue that some were passed without notification or 
consultation of the affected indigenous communities.39  They also claim that 
numerous decrees are not essential to the implementation of the free trade agreement, 
which is why the president has the power to issue them in the first place.40 
In August 2008, the indigenous communities carried out their first protests 
relating to President Garcia’s decrees.41  Indigenous people from over sixty 
communities halted the operations of an oil pipeline run by the state-owned 
organization Petroperu in the Loveta province, and occupied a hydroelectric power 
plant in Bagua.42  Four days after the protests began, another group of indigenous 
people took control over drilling platforms operated by Petroplus, a transnational 
                                                                 
31 Barrera-Hernandez, supra note 6. 
32 Id. (explaining further that indigenous communities have the ability to protect their land 
from the effect of these decrees by obtaining a legal title. However, obtaining a title is difficult 
because of the complex seventeen step process and the expensive legal procedures that are 
required). 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Barrera-Hernandez, supra note 6. 
38 See id. 
39 Abigail Poe, Protests in Peru, JUST THE FACTS, June 11, 2009, http:justf.org/blog/2009/ 
06/11/protests-peru. 
40 Dudenhoefer, supra note 20. 
41 Kiraz Janicke, Peru: Conflict Grows, Government Slumps, GREEN LEFT WEEKLY, Aug. 
16, 2008, http://www.greenleft.org.au/2008/763/39409. 
42 Id. 
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mining company.43  Following these events, Peru’s Congress repealed Decrees 1015 
and 1073 that were both intended to make sales of indigenous land easier.44  
Although Congress promised to vote on repealing eight other decrees having the 
same effect, the vote never occurred.45  Peru’s indigenous population retaliated by 
organizing a 30,000 person protest in which sixty-five tribes were represented.46 
Although the new protests were mild at first, tensions began to build, and by late 
April, protestors had blocked another oil pipeline in northern Peru, causing it to halt 
operations.47  Congress again responded by attempting to repeal another of the 
decrees, but was prevented by President Garcia’s administration.48  Effects of the 
protests only became worse as indigenous people blocked travel on roads, 
waterways, and even disrupted flights at remote airports.49  After President Garcia 
declared a sixty-day state of emergency in affected areas on May 9, the protests, 
which initially began in northern Peru in April, began to spread south.50  
After two months of enduring the protests, tensions came to a head when 
President Garcia sent 650 government police to restore order and bring down the 
blockades.  This decision resulted in multiple clashes and consequential fatalities on 
both sides.51  When police arrived at a roadblock in Bagua, a conflict erupted that 
took the lives of over thirty-five people.52  Indigenous leaders claim that the violence 
started when the police began firing at protestors from a helicopter,53 but government 
officials argue that the protestors were the initial aggressors.54  Some reports claim 
that the indigenous peoples were either unarmed or carrying only wooden spears and 
fighting only in self-defense;55 others contend that some of the protestors had guns 
and fired first, while other protestors took guns from the officers to use against 
                                                                 
43 Id. 
44 Survival, Amazon Indians’ Protest Forces Repeal of Laws, http://survivalinternational 
.org/news/3654 (last visited Mar. 1, 2011). 
45 See Lucien Chauvin, Peru’s Deadly Battle Over Oil in the Amazon, TIME, June 10, 
2009, available at http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1903707,00.html. 
46 See Rory Carroll, Peruvian Police Fire on Unarmed Indigenous Tribes’ Oil and Gas 
Protest, GUARDIAN, June 5, 2009, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jun/05/ 
amazon-tribes-police-protest-deaths. 
47 See Chauvin, supra note 45. 
48 See TAFT-MORALES, supra note 2, at 4. 
49 Simon Romero, Fatal Clashes Erupt in Peru at Roadblock, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2009, at 
A4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/06/world/americas/06peru.html?_r=2. 
50 Id. 
51 Poe, supra note 39. 
52 Id.  
53 Romero, supra note 49. 
54 Poe, supra note 39. 
55 John Gibler, Indigenous Protest and State Violence in the Peruvian Amazon: How the 
Media Misrepresents, HUFFINGTON POST (June 12, 2009, 3:22 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost 
.com/ john-gibler/indigenous-protest-and-st_b_214901.html. 
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them.56  In a separate conflict, also in Bagua, nine police officers were killed while 
government forces seized control of Petroperu’s petroleum facility from indigenous 
protestors.57  In the wake of these fatal events, Congress repealed two more 
presidential decrees, Decrees 1064 and 1090.58 There are still decrees in place, 
however, that negatively effect indigenous peoples’ land.  
B.  History of Promoting Foreign Investment 
The presidential decrees and consequential protests are only the most recent 
developments in Peru’s long tradition of promoting foreign investment.  The 
Peruvian government began promoting exploitation of its land in 1947, when it 
welcomed settlements established by people of both indigenous and European 
ancestry.59  These groups used the land for agriculture, logging, and extraction of 
minerals.60  They also built up the land’s infrastructure, which began the 
deforestation of Peru’s Amazon region.61  In 1990, President Alberto Fujimori began 
a large-scale program of “denationalization and privatization.”62  In order to facilitate 
trade, Fujimori took an active role in forming Peru’s legal policy by maneuvering 
legislation through parliament.63  Further, Fujimori bypassed the Peruvian 
Legislature for a two-year period when he governed by enacting presidential 
decrees.64  Today, seventy percent of Peru’s 173 million acres of rainforest have 
been, “granted or offered as concessions for oil and gas exploration.”65  The current 
President, Alan Garcia, has made many of these concessions.66  Indigenous groups 
who inhabit the Amazon region argue that the concessions violate their property 
rights because much of the land is believed to be ancestral communal land owned by 
the indigenous tribes.67 
Peru has also enacted legislation that creates incentives for investing in Peru’s 
Amazon region.  In 1999, Peru enacted Ley No. 27037 (Law 27037), which gives tax 
exemptions to transnational corporations who operated in Peru’s Amazon region,68 
                                                                 
56 Kraul & Leon, supra note 21. 
57 Romero, supra note 49. 
58 Barrera-Hernandez, supra note 6. 
59 EarthRights, supra note 16, at 11. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Foreign Law Guide: Peru, http://www.foreignlawguide.com/sample/Peru%20 
Introduction.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2011). 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 TAFT-MORALES, supra note 2, at 3. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 See Ley de Promocion de la Inversion en la Amazonia [Law on Investment Promotion 
in the Amazon, hereinafter Amazon Investment Law], Law No. 27037, art. 11, 12 (Dec. 30, 
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an area that is also occupied by numerous indigenous communities.69  In order to 
qualify for income tax benefits awarded by the legislation, the private investor must 
have seventy percent of its operations in the Amazon Region.70  Article nine of the 
act provides that the Transportation and Communications departments of 
government are to run infrastructure studies in order to facilitate the construction of 
port and airport infrastructure as well as roads into the jungle.71 
One year after the above-mentioned tax benefits took effect, Peru passed a 
comprehensive legal system regarding the concession of forestland.72  Under the new 
law, much of Peru’s forests were re-zoned to make granting concessions to timber-
seeking investors easier.73  In a superficial effort to remedy any land conflicts that 
were caused by the new legislation, the Peruvian officials also provided a titling 
program that afforded the indigenous communities an avenue to prevent their land 
from being taken.74  However, the project did not take effect in the Amazon region 
until 2001, whereas re-zoning of that forestland began in 2002, giving the affected 
indigenous communities a mere year to utilize the program.75  The provisions of 
these two laws and the actions of Peru’s administration illustrate that Peru’s 
indigenous people have been subject to the government’s policy of foreign 
investment promotion much longer than the last two years.  
C.  Multiple Instances of Corruption in Government 
Combined with the above-mentioned conflict and long-standing policy of 
encouraging foreign investment, a tradition of corruption in the presidential office 
further perpetuates tensions between the indigenous people of Peru and their 
domestic government.  During Alan Garcia’s first term as president, from 1985 to 
1990, he was repeatedly charged with corruption and human rights violations.76  
However, Alberto Fujimori, the candidate who defeated Garcia in the 1990 election, 
                                                          
1998), available at http://intranet2.minem.gob.pe/web/archivos/dgh/legislacion/l27037.pdf 
(act took effect on Jan. 1, 1999). 
69 Leiseca & Johnson, supra note 11. 
70 Amazon Investment Law, supra note 68, art. 11. 
71 Id. at art. 9. 
72 Ilmi Elijah Granoff, Peruvian Forest Law: Seeing the People for the Trees, 16 N.Y.U. 
ENVTL L.J. 533 (2008). 
73 Id. at 451; see Ley Forestal Y De Fauna Silvestre [Forestry and Wildlife Law], Law No. 
27308, arts 39, 45-47, July, 16, 2000, available at http://adaalegreconsultores.com.pe/normas/ 
Agricultura/8.pdf. 
74 Granoff, supra note 72, at 541 (citing Interview with Senior Forestry Officer, IRENA-
Pucallpa, in Peru (June 12, 2005). 
75 Granoff, supra note 72, at 542 (citing Int’l Research Group et al., Manual de 
Legislacion Forestal (Version Preliminar) 4 (2005)) (explaining further that much of the land 
occupied by indigenous peoples was re-zoned as a “production forest” which meant that it was 
possible for the government to grant the land to an investor in a concession, or give him a 
permit to harvest the land’s timber). 
76 TAFT-MORALES, supra note 2, at 1. 
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proved not to be any better.77  On April 7, 2009, Fujimori was convicted and 
sentenced to twenty-five years in prison by the Peruvian courts for crimes against 
humanity as well as corruption while in office.78  Although this conviction has been 
considered an accomplishment for the Peruvian judicial system that adds to its 
legitimacy, the system has traditionally been viewed as weak and easily influenced 
by political pressure.79  Further, convicting a former president who is no longer 
involved with the government still does not prove that the Peruvian courts are 
prepared to stand up to a currently governing president.  Finally, after Garcia was 
reelected in 2006, he again faced charges of corruption in October 2008.80  Garcia 
had to fire seven of his seventeen-member cabinet after their involvement in a 
scandal regarding alleged kickbacks for awarding specific contracts for oil 
exploration.81  Peru’s indigenous population would be reasonable in taking issue with 
the idea of relying on government personnel who accept bribes from foreign oil 
companies for protection of their land rights. 
Having illustrated a reasonable justification for the need of Peru’s indigenous 
people to protect their land rights against its domestic government, next is a 
discussion of Peru’s domestic and international obligations regarding its treatment of 
indigenous land rights. 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Peruvian law, as well as law promulgated by the Organization of American States 
(OAS) and the United Nations (UN), all protects indigenous land rights.  Each legal 
scheme protects indigenous communities’ right to own the land they occupy.  
Beyond this common ground, OAS and UN law provide for more direct protection of 
indigenous land rights than Peruvian law.  Each of these three legal frameworks 
formally guarantees the same legal rights to indigenous peoples, thus making the 
substance of any one body of law no more attractive than the other.  This is because 
the rights provided by treaties from the OAS and the UN are substantially similar, 
and Article 55 of Peru’s Constitution incorporates any active treaty into Peru’s 
domestic legal system.  However, differences among these governing bodies do exist 
in terms of their institutions and indigenous rights policy. 
A.  Peruvian Law 
Article 89 of the Peruvian Constitution explains that indigenous communities 
enjoy imprescriptible ownership of their land, and they alone may determine how 
that land can be used.82  Also, Peruvian Congress passed a law that created an 
                                                                 
77 See id. at 1-2. 
78 Id. at 5. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 2. 
81 TAFT-MORALES, supra note 2, at 2. 
82 See PERUVIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, art. 89. 
Rural and Native Communities are legally recognized and enjoy legal status. They are 
autonomous in terms of their organization, communal working, use and free disposal 
of their land, as well as economically and administratively within the framework 
established by law. Ownership of their land is imprescriptible except in the case of 
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organization in the executive branch called the National Institute for the 
Development of Andean, Amazonian, and Afro-Peruvian People (INDEPA), which 
is responsible for promoting, coordinating, evaluating, and approving projects and 
policies intended to support Peru’s indigenous citizens.83  
Further, Peru’s administration has adopted multiple international treaties that 
protect indigenous land rights and sovereignty, which will be discussed below.84  
Article 55 of Peru’s Constitution provides that, “Treaties concluded by the 
government and now in affect are part of national law.”85  This provision applies to 
make Peru’s international obligations under treaties it has ratified also binding as a 
matter of national law.  This means that under Peru’s Constitution, it is a violation of 
Peruvian national law for the government to disregard international obligations 
imposed on the government through treaties it has ratified.  Therefore, provisions of 
UN and OAS treaties must be respected because, through Article 55, they have been 
incorporated into Peruvian domestic law.  However, the methods by which the 
presidential decrees mentioned above were passed violated some of Peru’s 
international obligations, suggesting that the Peruvian government has not yet given 
much effect to treaty provisions.  This point will be further developed in Section IV. 
B.  Law of the Organization of American States 
Similar to the UN, the OAS is an international body that is composed of the 
nations making up North, South, and Central America.86  OAS’s human rights 
system (also referred to as the Inter-American Human Rights System) starts with a 
body called the Inter-American Rights Commission (Commission).87  The 
Commission is responsible for investigating human rights practices of the state-
members of the OAS, and can also hear complaints from those individuals who 
                                                          
abandonment described in the preceding article. The government respects the cultural 
identity of the Rural and Native Communities. 
83 See Ley del Instituto Nacional de Desarrollo de Pueblos Andinos, Amazonicos y 
Afroperuano [Law of the National Institute of Development of Andean, Amazonian, and Afro-
Peruvian Towns, hereinafter Andean Law], Law No. 28495, April 2005, available at 
http://www.servindi.org/pdf/Ley28495.pdf. 
Art. 1, sec. 2 states: The INDEPA is the governing body of national policies 
responsible for proposing and monitoring compliance with national policies, and 
coordinating with the Regional Governments when implementing projects and 
programs aimed at promoting, advocacy, research and affirmation of the rights, 
development, and identity of Andean, Amazonian, and Afro Peoples. 
84 EarthRights, supra note 16, at 38. 
85 PERUVIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, art. 55  
86 See Charter of the Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394, 
O.A.S.T.S. No. 67 [hereinafter OAS Charter]. 
87 Andrew Huff, Indigenous Rights, Local Resources and International Law: Indigenous 
Land Rights and the New Self-Determination, 16 COLO J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 295, 328 
(citing S. James Anaya & Robert A. Williams Jr., The Protection of Indigenous Peoples’ 
Rights over Lands and Natural Resources Under the Inter-American Human Rights System, 14 
HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 33, 35 (2001)). 
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claim that their national government has engaged in human rights violations.88  
OAS’s human rights system also contains the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights (Court), which is the judicial organ of the OAS and hears human rights cases 
in the American States.89  Article 62 of the American Convention on Human Rights 
(Convention) provides that at the time of ratification, a state-party may declare that it 
recognizes the decisions of the Court as binding.90  Peru made such a declaration 
when it ratified the Convention in 1981.91  Although Peru later withdrew its 
declaration in 1999, it re-declared in 2001.92  Therefore, Peru currently recognizes 
the Court’s decisions as binding. 
Human rights legislation has been passed by the General Assembly of the OAS in 
the form of the American Convention on Human Rights (American Convention) and 
the Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man (Declaration).93  Both the American 
Convention and Declaration provide that everyone has a right to use and enjoy 
property;94 however, indigenous peoples’ rights were specifically denoted in OAS’s 
later document, the Proposed American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples (Proposed Declaration).95 
The Commission has interpreted combined provisions of the Convention and 
Declaration to indicate that property rights attach to land, if it is maintained by 
indigenous people in accordance with their traditional system of land tenure.96  
Therefore, as long as an indigenous person is using land in compliance of his 
                                                                 
88 See Anaya & Williams, supra note 87, at 35 (citing The Human Rights Situation of 
Indigenous Peoples in the Americas, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/Ser.L./VII.108.doc.63 (2000)). 
89 See Inter-American Commison of Human Rights Homepage, supra note 14. 
90 Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights art. 62, Nov. 
22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter American Convention]. 
91 See American Convention Ratification Page, available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/ 
English/sigs/b-32.html. 
92 Id. 
93 Anaya & Williams, supra note 87, at 41.  
94 See American Convention, supra note 90, art. 21 (“Everyone has the right to use and 
enjoyment of his property, the law may subordinate such use and enjoyment to the interest of 
society. No one shall be deprived of his property except upon payment of just compensation, 
for reasons of public utility or social interest, and in the cases according to the forms 
established by law.”); Organization of American States, American Declaration of the Rights 
and Duties of Man art. 23, Apr. 1948,  O.A.S. Res. XXX, reprinted in Basic Documents 
Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OAS/Ser.L/V/I.4 Rev. 9 (2003) 
(Every person has a right to own such private property as meets the essential needs of decent 
living and helps to maintain the dignity of the individual and the home.). 
95 See Proposed American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples [hereinafter 
Proposed Declaration], approved by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights at its 
133rd session on Feb. 26, 1997, in OEA/SerL/V/II95.doc.7, rev. 1997. 
96 Awas Case, supra note 15, at para. 151. 
“As a result of customary practices, possession of the land should suffice for 
indigenous communities lacking real title to property of the land to obtain full 
recognition of that property, and for consequent registration.” 
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community’s traditional “property law,” he will gain a right to use that land 
regardless of what the official law of the state holds.97  This principle is illustrated by 
the Commission’s statement in the Proposed American Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (Proposed Declaration), which provides: 
Indigenous peoples have the right to legal recognition of their varied and 
specific forms and modes of possession, control, and enjoyment of 
territories and property, on the basis of each state’s legal system.98 
In the event that a state’s government acts in such a way that will affect an 
indigenous community’s land rights, the Proposed Declaration requires that the state 
notify and consult the indigenous community that will be affected before the action 
is carried out.99  The Proposed Declaration emphasizes the importance of this right 
by clarifying it again in articles XV and XXI that give indigenous peoples the right 
to participate in all levels of decision-making in matters, as well as legislative 
measures which may affect their rights, lives, and destinies, and that states must 
obtain informed consent from indigenous peoples before enacting a plan or program 
affecting their rights or living conditions.100 
C.  Law of the United Nations 
Like the OAS, the UN also has a body to which indigenous people can look to for 
help called the International Labour Organization (ILO).101  The ILO was originally 
                                                                 
97 See id. 
98 Proposed Declaration, supra note 95, art. XVIII.  
99 Id at art. XIII. 
Indigenous peoples have the right to be informed and consulted regarding measures 
which could affect their environment, including information ensuring their effective 
participation in acts and policies which might affect it . . . Indigenous people have the 
right to full participation in formulating, planning, managing, and applying 
governmental programs and policies for the conservation and exploitation of their 
lands, territories, and resources. 
100 Id. at art XV, XXI. 
Article XV: Indigenous peoples have the right to participate without discrimination, if 
they so decide, in decision-making, at all levels, concerning matters which might 
affect their rights, lives, and destiny. They may do so directly or through 
representatives chosen by them pursuant to their own procedures. They shall also have 
the right to maintain and develop their own indigenous decision-making institutions, 
as well as equal opportunities to gain access to, and participate in, all national 
institutions and fora.  
Article XXI: Unless exceptional circumstances so warrant in the public interest, the 
states shall take the necessary measures to ensure that decisions regarding any plan, 
program, or proposal affecting the rights or living conditions of indigenous peoples are 
not made without free and informed consent and participation of those peoples; that 
their preferences are recognized; and that no provision which might have negative 
effects on those peoples is adopted. 
101 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 54 (Joshua Castellino & Niamh Walsh 
eds., Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2005). 
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focused on addressing labor and social policy; however, this focal point has grown to 
encompass the protection of indigenous rights.102  The ILO addressed indigenous 
issues when it began adopting conventions that concerned problems of indigenous 
workers regarding labor contracts and working conditions.103  Thereafter, the ILO 
headed the UN’s Andean Indian Programme, which was “an integrated programme 
for regional development ultimately involving several countries and the indigenous 
peoples living there . . . .”104  It was during this time that the ILO passed Convention 
107, also known as the Indigenous and Tribal Populations Convention, which was 
the precedent to Convention 169.105  
Convention 169 (ILO Convention), alternatively called the Indigenous and Tribal 
Peoples Convention,106 was proposed by the ILO and adopted by the UN General 
Assembly in 1989.107  It was ratified by Peru on February 2, 1994.108  Another 
relevant UN instrument is the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(UN Declaration).  Both documents provide that state governments must consult 
indigenous communities, and allow for their input in the decision-making process 
before approving any project, program, or legislative change that would affect their 
land or the resources connected therewith.109  In the event it is necessary to relocate 
an indigenous community, the ILO Convention and UN Declaration explain that 
relocation can only occur with free and informed consent of the community 
concerned, the persons being relocated must be paid fair compensation, and when 
possible, they are to be given the option to return to the land at a later time.110 
                                                                 
102 See id. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/. 
107 See Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, available at http://www.ilo.org/ 
ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?C169.  
108 See Table of Ratification, available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/ratifce.pl? 
C169. 
109 See Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, 
arts. 6, 7, 15, June 27, 1989, 72 ILO Official Bull. 59 [hereinafter ILO Convention], and UN 
Declaration, supra note 1. 
110 See ILO Convention, supra note 109, art. 16, and UN Declaration, supra note 1, art. 
10. 
Art. 16: Where the relocation of these peoples is considered necessary as an 
exceptional measure, such relocation shall take place only with their free and informed 
consent. Where their consent cannot be obtained, such relocation shall take place only 
following appropriate procedures established by national laws and regulations, 
including public inquiries where appropriate, which provide the opportunity for 
effective representation of the peoples concerned. Whenever possible, these peoples 
shall have the right to return to their traditional lands, as soon as the grounds for 
relocation cease to exist. 
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Both instruments also indicate that indigenous people shall be granted property 
rights and sovereignty to decide how land is used regarding not only territory they 
have traditionally occupied, but also land and resources that they have traditionally 
used or had access to.111  They further explain that legal recognition by the state shall 
be given to customary land tenure systems, as well as procedures by which the 
indigenous communities transfer land rights.112 
With a few variances, the three bodies of law guarantee the same property rights 
to indigenous peoples.  Article 89 of the Peruvian Constitution grants indigenous 
peoples land ownership, and gives them the right to autonomously determine how to 
use that land.113  Virtually the same right is articulated in article XVIII of OAS’s 
Proposed Declaration,114 as well as provisions of UN’s Draft Declaration115 and the 
ILO Convention.116  Further, all three bodies have created organizations whose 
responsibilities include protecting the rights of indigenous peoples (INDEPA, Inter-
American Rights Commission, Human Rights Council, and ILO). 
The OAS and UN exceed legislative protection for indigenous land rights of 
Peru’s Constitution by providing that land tenure systems practiced by indigenous 
                                                          
Art. 10: Indigenous peoples shall not be forcibly removed from their lands or 
territories. No relocation shall take place without the free and informed consent of the 
indigenous peoples concerned and after agreement on just and fair compensation and, 
where possible, with the option of return. 
111 See ILO Convention, supra note 109, art. 14 (explaining that particular attention shall 
be paid to nomadic peoples, who should be given rights to land which they traditionally use, 
rather than occupy); UN Declaration, supra note 1, art.26. 
Indigenous peoples have the right to own, use, develop and control the lands, 
territories and resources that they possess by reason of traditional ownership or other 
traditional occupation or use, as well as those which they have otherwise acquired.  
States shall give legal recognition and protection to these lands, territories and 
resources.  Such recognition shall be conducted with due respect to the customs, 
traditions and land tenure systems of the indigenous peoples concerned. 
112 See ILO Convention, supra note 109, art. 17, and UN Declaration, supra note 1, arts 
26, 27. 
Article 17: Procedures established by the peoples concerned for the transmission of 
land rights among members of these peoples shall be respected. The peoples 
concerned shall be consulted whenever consideration is being given to their capacity 
to alienate their lands or otherwise transmit their rights outside their own community. 
Persons not belonging to these peoples shall be prevented from taking advantage of 
their customs or of lack of understanding of the laws on the part of their members to 
secure the ownership, possession or use of land belonging to them. 
113 PERUVIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, art. 89. 
114 See Proposed Declaration, supra note 95, art. XVIII. 
. . . Indigenous peoples are entitled to recognition of their property and ownership 
rights with respect to lands, territories, and resources they have traditionally 
historically occupied, and to the use of those to which they also have had access for 
their traditional activities and livelihood. 
115 UN Declaration, supra note 1, arts. 26, 27. 
116 See ILO Convention, supra note 109, art. 14. 
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communities should be recognized by a state’s domestic law, and potentially affected 
indigenous populations must give the government consent before it approves of any 
program or legislation that may alter the population’s rights.  However, as mentioned 
before, all of the treaties mentioned in this section have been ratified by Peru, and 
article 55 of the Peruvian Constitution incorporates all ratified treaties into its 
domestic law.  Consequently, any excess rights granted by these treaties should have 
legal force in Peru’s national legal system.  Article 55 of Peru’s Constitution 
therefore applies to make internationally guaranteed rights enforceable in Peruvian 
law, putting these three legal frameworks on an even setting.  The next section 
illustrates how the above-mentioned rights have been recently violated and in the 
past by the Peruvian Government.  
IV.  APPLICATION OF LAW TO THE PRACTICES OF PERU’S GOVERNMENT 
Although the above-mentioned bodies of law provide numerous protections for 
indigenous rights, a visible gap exists between the rights as they are written and the 
recognition of those rights in practice.  Peru’s government has passed laws that 
infringe on indigenous peoples’ land rights, and occasionally the methods by which 
the laws were enacted constituted a violation of the right of prior consultation 
guaranteed by OAS’s Proposed Declaration, and ILO Convention 169. 
For example, Law 27307, mentioned in section II,117 gives tax benefits to 
transnational corporations who operate in the Amazon region.118  Enticing foreign 
investors to exploit a region inhabited by indigenous peoples is a violation of their 
imprescriptible land rights under Peru’s Constitution as well as their right to decide 
how their land should be used.119  The policy illustrated by these tax benefits 
undercuts the autonomy given to indigenous people in OAS’s Draft Declaration120 
and Convention 169.121  While it is uncertain whether the affected indigenous 
communities were consulted before this legislation was passed, it is unlikely that 
they would have agreed to a program that purports to facilitate the degradation of 
their environment. 
The new forest legislation, also mentioned in Section II,122 similarly infringes on 
indigenous land rights.  Like the presidential decrees that inspired the protests in 
2008 and 2009, indigenous people inhabiting the effected area were unaware of the 
new re-zoning law.123  This failure to inform them of the new legislation constitutes a 
violation of Article XIII of OAS’s Proposed Declaration and Article 6 of ILO 
                                                                 
117 See supra pp. 232-33. 
118 See Amazon Investment Law, supra note 68, arts. 11, 12. 
119 See PERUVIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, art. 89. 
120 See Proposed Declaration, supra note 95, art. XXI. 
121 See ILO Convention, supra note 109, art. 14. 
122 See supra p.233. 
123 Granoff, supra note 72, at 541, 543 (citing Interview with Campesino 1, in Peru (June 
16, 2005); Interview with Campesino 2, in Peru (June 16, 2005) (Both were personal 
interviews between the author and indigenous natives)). 
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Convention 169.124  Although Peru’s government provided for a titling program in an 
attempt to resolve land conflicts, once again, few indigenous people were notified of 
the titling project, and most of the communities lacked title to the land they 
occupied, meaning application of the new law would lead to their land being re-
zoned as a production-forest, and would be sold to foreign investors.125 
Most recently, indigenous people argue that they were not consulted when 
President Garcia passed Decree 1015.  The law significantly impacts indigenous 
peoples’ ability to protect their land from exploitation by foreign investors.126  The 
U.S. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor reported on human rights 
practices in Peru in 2004, stating that the ability of indigenous people to participate 
in decision-making that affects their land was continually impeded.127  The report 
notes that although Article 2 of the Peruvian Constitution gives all Peruvian citizens 
the right to speak their native language when speaking before any government 
authority (the conversation is to be translated by an interpreter), the government 
officials said language barriers were the reason that the indigenous people were not 
involved in the decision-making process.128  The failure to include the indigenous 
communities in making decisions regarding their land is a simultaneous violation of 
Article 2 of Peru’s Constitution as well as the right of consultation in OAS’s 
Proposed Declaration and ILO’s Convention 169.129 
The above examples show that the Peruvian government refuses to respect or 
enforce the substance of indigenous peoples’ land rights, and that those rights tend to 
be secondary to the government’s interest in promoting foreign investment.  Peru’s 
Constitution, as well as treaties under the OAS and UN, all protect indigenous land 
rights.  However, Peru’s government has continued to engage in conduct that 
violates textual provisions of each document.  Initially, the forest legislation and the 
decrees were passed without proper consultation.  Further, the application of each of 
the above laws works to infringe on indigenous peoples’ imprescriptible land 
ownership as well as their sovereign right to decide how their land should be used.  
                                                                 
124 Proposed Declaration, supra note 95, art. XIII; ILO Convention, supra note 109, arts. 
6, 7. 
125 Granoff, supra note 72, at 541, 543 (citing Interview with Campesino 1 (explaining 
that there was no incentive for indigenous people to seek title to their land before enactment of 
the new legislation because before it was passed, forest exploitation could be conducted by an 
investor without obtaining title to the land)). 
126 TAFT-MORALES, supra note 2, at 3. 
127 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, & Labor, U.S. Dep’t of State, Country Reports 
on Human Rights Practices-2004, Peru (2005), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/ 
hrrpt/2004/41771.htm [hereinafter 2004 Peru Report]. 
128 See 2004 Peru Report, supra note 127; PERUVIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, art. 2. 
Every individual has the right . . . to his ethnic and cultural identity. The government 
recognizes and protects the ethnic and cultural plurality of the nation. Any Peruvian 
unable to express himself in Spanish has the right to use his own language before any 
authority through an interpreter. Foreigners enjoy the same right when summoned 
before any authority. 
129 Proposed Declaration, supra note 95, art. XIII; ILO Convention, supra note 109, arts. 
6, 7. 
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The Peruvian government has been violating indigenous land rights since early 1999, 
thus declining to give the rights any substantive value.  Therefore, when Peru’s 
government engages in activity that infringes on indigenous peoples’ rights, the 
communities must seek a solution outside of Peru’s domestic legal system.  Along 
with showing how the OAS practices a policy of protecting indigenous rights, the 
next section also highlights institutional characteristics that separate the OAS from 
both the Peruvian and UN legal system. 
V.  DIFFERENCES IN THE INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANS OF PERU, THE OAS, AND THE 
UN MAKE THE OAS THE BEST CHOICE FOR PERU’S INDIGENOUS PEOPLE TO ASSERT 
THEIR LAND RIGHTS 
As mentioned in Section III, Peru’s domestic system, the OAS, and the UN grant 
indigenous people substantially similar land rights.  However, institutional 
differences among these three organizations exist, and when they are highlighted, it 
becomes apparent that Peru’s indigenous population is most likely to obtain judicial 
protection of their land rights in the OAS’s Inter-American Court.  Regretfully 
however, this may not adequately remedy the indigenous people’s situation.  The 
OAS still lacks an enforcement mechanism to compel compliance with the Inter-
American Court’s decisions, and this has led to nations disregarding the Court’s 
orders in the past.130  The OAS is still preferable to the other two organizations 
because, among other reasons, Peru’s domestic court is unlikely to uphold 
indigenous land rights due to the political tradition of disregarding them as 
mentioned in Sections II and IV, and the ICJ of the UN only hears cases brought by 
state-members,131 which an indigenous community cannot qualify as. 
A.  Differences Between the OAS and Peru Show that the OAS is a  
Preferable Venue to Peru’s Domestic Judicial System 
Where Peru’s government has passed laws that promote foreign investment at the 
expense of indigenous land rights,132 the Inter-American Court has rendered judicial 
decisions that produce the exact opposite outcome.  The following are a few case 
examples illustrating how the Inter-American Court has applied the legal provisions 
mentioned in Section III to human rights violations committed by their state-
members.  These decisions suggest a trend toward affording broad protection for 
indigenous peoples’ land rights.133 
In 2001, the Inter-American Court heard the case of Mayagna (Sumo Community 
of Awas Tigni) v. Nicaragua.134  This conflict arose from Nicaragua’s concession of 
                                                                 
130 See Leonardo J. Alvarado, Prospects and Challenges in the Implementation of 
Indigenous Peoples’ Human Rights in International Law: Lessons from the Case of Awas 
Tingni v. Nicaragua, 24 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP LAW 609, 619-620 (2007). 
131 International Court of Justice Case Page, supra note 13. 
132 See Amazon Investment Law, supra note 68; Forestry and Wildlife Law, supra note 
73. 
133 See generally Awas case, supra note 15; Mary case, supra note 15; Maya case, supra 
note 15; Paraguay case, supra note 15. 
134 See Alvarado, supra note 130, at 609. 
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Awas land to a foreign investor.135  However, the state made this concession without 
gaining the community’s consent, which constituted a violation of Nicaragua’s 
Constitution,136 as well as the Awas’ rights under the American Convention.137 
The Court found that Nicaragua was in violation of Article 25 of the American 
Convention because it had not afforded the indigenous population the protection of a 
competent court.138  In rendering this holding, the Court explained that although 
Nicaragua’s Constitution recognized indigenous land tenure rights, it failed to give 
indigenous peoples a judicial remedy that would allow them to challenge state 
violations.139  It stated that the mere availability of judicial remedies is not adequate 
to comply with the Convention if they are not effective.140 
Ultimately, the Court held that Nicaragua must enact legislative and 
administrative provisions that would create an effective procedure for the 
demarcation and titling of indigenous territory.141  Further, the newly adopted 
procedures must be in accordance with the customary law of the indigenous people 
whose land was being affected.142 
Later, in the case of Mary and Carrie Dann v. the U.S., the Danns brought a suit 
against the United States (U.S.) when it confiscated Western Shoshone land.143  
Although the U.S. had set up a commission to hear such claims domestically (called 
the Indian Claims Commission, or ICC), the ICC failed to grant the Danns relief.144  
In deciding the case, the Inter-American Court found that international mechanisms 
such as the Proposed Declaration may be consulted when it is interpreting and 
applying the terms of the OAS human rights legislation such as the American 
                                                                 
135 See Awas case, supra note 15, at para. ¶ 2. 
136 Alvarado, supra note 130, at 610-11 (citing Constitucion Politica de la República de 
Nicaragua [Cn.] [Constitution] tit. I, ch. I, art. 5, tit. IV, ch. VI, art. 89, La Gaceta [L.G.] 9 
January 1987 [hereinafter Nicaraguan Constitution]; Ley No. 28, 2 Sept. 1987, Estatuto de 
Autonomia de las Regiones Autonomas de las Costa Atlantica de Nicaragua [hereinafter 
Autonomy Statute]) (explaining that Nicaragua’s Constitution recognized communal forms 
of indigenous land ownership. Nicaragua also had a statute which provided that “indigenous 
communal property consists of the land, waters, and forests that have traditionally belonged 
to the communities of the Atlantic Coast.”). 
137 See Awas case, supra note 15, at ¶ 2. 
138 Awas case, supra note 15, ¶¶ 1, 2; American Convention, supra note 90. 
Art. 25: Everyone has the right to simple and prompt recourse, or any other effective 
recourse, to a competent court or tribunal for protection against acts that violate his 
fundamental rights recognized by the constitution or laws of the state concerned or by 
this convention, even though such violation may have been committed by persons 
acting in the course of their official duties. 
139 See Awas case, supra note 15, at ¶ 164. 
140 Id. at ¶ 114. 
141 Id. at ¶ 164. 
142 Id. 
143 Mary Case, supra note 15, at ¶ 2. 
144 Id. 
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Convention in the context of indigenous rights.145  This holding further illustrates the 
Court’s trend of promoting indigenous land rights because the Proposed Declaration 
exclusively protects the rights of indigenous people.146  By applying the Proposed 
Draft’s provisions when deciding human rights cases, the Court effectively makes it 
binding on OAS members even though it has not yet been passed by the OAS’s 
General Assembly.  The Court ultimately ordered the U.S. to adopt legislative 
measures necessary to protect the Danns’ property rights.147 
The Court then heard Maya Indigenous Communities of the Toledo District.148 
This case arose because the state had given foreign investors logging and oil 
concessions regarding land that was occupied by indigenous peoples without 
previously consulting them.149  The Court held that this was a violation of the right to 
consultation,150 stating that one of the “central elements to the protection of 
indigenous property rights is the requirement that states undertake effective and fully 
informed consultations with indigenous communities regarding acts or decisions that 
may affect their traditional territories.”151 
The most recent relevant case heard by the Inter-American Court was 
Sawhoyamaza v. Paraguay.152  In deciding this case, the Court held that an 
indigenous community’s traditional possession of its territory has equivalent legal 
affect to that of an official state-granted property title.153  The Court also stated that, 
in the event where an indigenous community loses possession of its ancestral land, 
the community is entitled to restitution.154 
The trend of protecting indigenous rights shown by the cases above is a 
significant difference between the Peruvian legal system and the OAS.  As shown 
before, Peru has been passing laws promoting foreign investment since 1999, and 
thus has failed to give OAS treaty provisions substantive effect when making the 
law.155  Conversely, since 2001, the Inter-American Court has strictly applied the 
provisions of OAS treaties to hold that encouraging foreign investment will not be 
tolerated if it infringes on indigenous land rights.  This difference makes the OAS a 
                                                                 
145 Id. at ¶ 129 (explaining that the Court maintained this position even though the 
Proposed Draft American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples had not yet been 
approved by the OAS General Assembly nor ratified by the United States). 
146 See generally Proposed Declaration, supra note 95. 
147 See Mary case, supra note 15, at ¶ 173. 
148 See Alvarado, supra note 130. 
149 See Maya Case, supra note 15, at ¶¶ 2, 5. 
150 Id. at ¶ 194. 
151 Id. at ¶ 142 (explaining further that the object of the consultation was to ensure that any 
decisions which may affect indigenous property are based on fully informed consent from the 
indigenous community). 
152 See Alvaro, supra note 130, at 616. 
153 Paraguay Case, supra note 15, at ¶ 128. 
154 Id. 
155 See Amazon Investment Law, supra note 68 (passed in 1999). 
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more attractive venue for the indigenous peoples.  If the Inter-American Court 
continues to apply this policy, it should work well for Peru’s indigenous population. 
Regardless of the Court’s trend of upholding indigenous land rights, its lack of 
ability to enforce its orders cannot be overlooked.  For example, after the decision in 
the Awas Case, the Nicaraguan government neglected to implement adequate 
judicial remedies for the indigenous people, and did not demarcate their land, failing 
to meet the Court’s order in both respects.156  Further, third party encroachment on 
Awas territory became more frequent even after the Court’s decision.157  Still today, 
even after the Court issued a provisional measure in 2002 ordering Nicaragua to 
prevent the third-party encroachment, Nicaragua has still not satisfactorily addressed 
the issues presented in that case.158 
Similarly, in the OAS’s Annual Report on the Status of Compliance with the 
Court’s orders, the Inter-American Commission states that as of 2009, the U.S. has 
failed to comply with the Court’s recommendations given in Mary and Carrie 
Dann.159  Although Belize has made “important efforts and actions,” the Commission 
stated that it also has not substantially complied with the Court’s recommendations 
in Maya Indigenous Communities of the Toledo District because logging continues 
on indigenous land, impacting the community’s ability to hunt.160  Finally, after the 
decision in Sawhoyamaza v. Paraguay, the Court had to issue a provisional order in 
February 2007 because Paraguay had failed to comply with thirteen of the Court’s 
seventeen orders.161  Although Paraguay’s noncompliance was based on a failure to 
provide adequate health care to the indigenous community,162 it nevertheless 
illustrates that there is not a forceful incentive in place to compel compliance. 
Although the OAS has had difficulty enforcing some of its decisions in the past, 
the 2009 report shows that, out of twelve Inter-American cases that involved Peru, its 
government has “fully complied” with three of the decisions, “partially complied” 
with eight, and completely failed to comply only once.163  This shows that just 
obtaining a judgment from the Inter-American Court is likely to result in some gain 
for Peru’s indigenous people.  Further, because Peru has a history of disregarding 
indigenous land rights, it is likely that its domestic courts will fail to even decide a 
claim in favor of the indigenous population, whereas the Inter-American Court, 
through the above cases, has shown that it will. 
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Institutional characteristics also help to make the OAS an attractive venue.  For 
instance, whereas the Peruvian courts have been plagued by allegations of weakness 
and susceptibility to influence from the other branches of Peru’s government,164 the 
Inter-American Court is an independent judicial body made up of members from 
different American States.165  This disconnection with any domestic government 
increases the Court’s impartiality.166  The vulnerability of Peru’s courts to political 
influence, as compared with the impartiality of the Inter-American Court is another 
reason why Peru’s domestic courts would be an inferior option for pursuit by Peru’s 
indigenous population.  As President Garcia has shown through his decrees that he 
does not believe in substantive protection of indigenous land rights,167 it is likely that 
he will use political pressure to influence Peru’s courts to decide on such a matter in 
his favor. 
As mentioned in Section II, Peru’s government also has allegations of corruption 
in its past.  President Garcia discharged seven members of his cabinet for taking 
kickbacks and bribes in return from offering exploration contracts.168  Although it is 
not certain, it would not be a surprise if those who offered the bribes for the contracts 
similarly offered bribes to influence the Court’s judgment.  Because the Inter-
American Court is not overly burdened by any kind of economic agenda, it is less 
vulnerable to such temptations.  The members of the Inter-American Court should 
also be given some credibility because of their pattern of deciding against foreign 
investors as shown in the cases mentioned above. 
B.  Differences Between the OAS and the UN Make the OAS a More  
Attractive Venue to Peru’s Indigenous Population than the UN 
Treaties in both the OAS and the UN confer substantially similar land rights to 
indigenous peoples; however, differences between the investigative and judicial 
branches of these organizations make the OAS the best option for Peru’s indigenous 
peoples.  For instance, the OAS, having only 35 members, is a smaller organization 
and its members are tied to one region,169 whereas the UN is comprised of 192 
nations that are spread throughout the world.170  Because it has far less members to 
oversee, the OAS may focus more in depth with regional relations while the UN 
must monitor the interactions between its 192 state-members. 
Having membership limited to nations who are geographically close should make 
political pressure coming from the organization and its closely situated state-
members stronger and more effective than that of the UN.  Any political pressure 
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exerted from an outside source is likely to have more effect if coming from a 
neighboring state than a distant one.  For example, President Garcia began 
implementing his decrees in order to facilitate the Peru Trade Promotion Agreement 
with the United States.171  The United States therefore has had some influence on 
Peru’s observance of indigenous land rights.  If the U.S. were to amend the 
agreement, making it contingent on Peru’s substantive protection on such rights, 
President Garcia will be more compelled to rethink the decrees. 
Although the UN and OAS both have judicial organs committed to rendering 
objective decisions based on international principles,172 the ICJ only hears cases 
brought by state-members of the UN.173  This principle forbids the ICJ from hearing 
a case brought by a group representing the interests of Peru’s indigenous peoples.  
Although indirectly, the Inter-American Court does hear cases regarding the claims 
of individuals or groups.174  Also, in 2001, Peru declared that it recognizes decisions 
rendered by the Inter-American Court as binding.175  Therefore, even though both 
organizations have bodies that are committed to investigating and notifying them of 
human rights violations, the OAS stands out from the UN because it also has a 
judicial body that can hear the indigenous peoples’ case and render a decision that 
Peru recognizes as binding. 
The fact that the OAS affords a judicial body that can hear a case brought to it by 
an indigenous group clearly makes it more beneficial to the indigenous population.176  
Having a case heard by a judicial actor is important because, in addition to having an 
interest in upholding human rights, courts also have an interest in objectively 
applying relevant legal principles.  The Inter-American Court will not advocate for 
the rights of indigenous communities; it will impartially apply the law to the facts of 
the case, leading it to come to a well-reasoned conclusion based on the merits.  This 
type of rational decision-making by an impartial court is preferable because it affords 
more legitimacy to the final holding. 
Another advantage of the OAS is that the Vice President of the Inter-American 
Court is from Peru,177 whereas only one of the ICJ’s fifteen members is from South 
America (Brazil).178  Although they both have at least one member who should be 
familiar with Peru’s situation, twelve of the ICJ’s remaining fifteen members hail 
from countries located on distant continents.179  Having a member on the Court from 
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Peru should add to the legitimacy of the Court’s decision in the view of Peru’s 
citizens.180  Furthermore, since he is from Peru, the Vice President should have a 
good sense of the situation confronting the indigenous communities.  This, together 
with the fact that the OAS is a close-knit organization, should increase the Court’s 
legitimacy because the decisions will not be handed down by judges from another 
continent that are less able to relate to the situations of the parties.  This kind of 
firsthand observance is something that anybody working under the UN is unlikely to 
match. 
The final difference between the two organizations, giving the OAS an important 
advantage over the UN, is that the ICJ has heard only 146 cases since 1947,181 
whereas the Inter-American Court heard 211 cases between 1987 and 2009.182  
Whether this is a function of the ICJ being selective in accepting cases, or of states 
simply not submitting cases, the fact that wronged parties have continually come to 
the Inter-American Court more times in fewer years lends support to the idea that it 
is viewed as a legitimate international adjudicator.  Also, if the ICJ is being selective, 
this difference between the two makes the Inter-American Court a better option 
because the indigenous people stand a better chance of having their case accepted by 
the court that hears the most cases. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, Peru’s indigenous people should assert their claims against Peru’s 
government in OAS’s Inter-American Court. The Court has decided multiple cases 
in favor of indigenous peoples’ land rights, including some that specifically uphold 
the right of prior consultation, which is said to have been violated when Presidential 
Decrees were passed.183  Also, members of the Inter-American Court are distant 
enough from Peru’s government that they will not be coerced by it; however, they 
are not so distant that a judgment from them would lack legitimacy to Peru’s 
citizens.  Finally, along with hearing more cases than the ICJ, the OAS affords 
Peru’s indigenous people an opportunity to petition the Inter-American Commission, 
which then can pass their case on to the Inter-American Court, giving it an advantage 
over the ICJ that can only hear cases between two state-members. 
Although the OAS is preferable to the systems of Peru and the UN, there are still 
some problems indigenous people will have to overcome both before and after they 
submit their case to the Inter-American Commission.  Initially, Article 46 of the 
American Convention provides that the American Commission may not be 
petitioned until all domestic remedies have been exhausted,184 meaning that the 
indigenous people are compelled to first file their claim in Peru’s domestic system.  
This threshold that must be met will surely cost the indigenous people and their 
attorneys time and money to litigate a case in a court that has been viewed as weak 
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and easily influenced.185  However, by raising the constitutional and international 
legal arguments available to them, the indigenous people can simply file a case in 
Peru’s court and overcome this barrier. 
The second, and more pressing, issue is that the OAS does not have a mechanism 
in place to enforce any judgment rendered by the Inter-American Court.  This is 
illustrated by the difficulty the Court has had in enforcing its decision in the cases 
mentioned above.  In order for indigenous people like those in Peru to be afforded 
full protection of their rights, the OAS needs to find some enforcement mechanism 
to implement its decisions.  Although political pressure can sometimes be an 
effective tool, the Inter-American Court needs a more stable threat to enable it to 
compel compliance. 
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